On the Use of Secret Sharing as a Secure Multi-use Pad by Buckley, Neil et al.
Innovations Syst Softw Eng (xxxx) x:xx–xx  
DOI  
 
ORIGINAL PAPER 
 
 
On the Use of Secret Sharing as a Secure Multi-use Pad 
 
Neil Buckley • Atulya K. Nagar • S. Arumugam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract Secret sharing (SS) is a cryptographic method 
proposed independently by Adi Shamir and George 
Blakley in 1979 to encode the keys of public-key 
cryptography by splitting them into maximally entropic 
shares that are distributed to participants, only revealing 
the secret when combined.  Each new sharing instance, 
even of the same key, produces a different set of shares to 
distribute anew.  This paper investigates SS as an 
independent cipher to secure confidential messages 
between a limited set of trusted participants by eliminating 
the need to redistribute shares.  A participant's master share 
is permanently fixed and unlimited temporary shares are 
created and combined with it to reveal new messages.  
Security is argued against specific and general attacks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Secret Sharing (SS) was developed by Shamir[20] and 
Blakley[5] as a solution to the secure distribution of keys 
in public-key cryptography.  In Shamir's Secret Sharing 
(SSS), there are n shares, any k of which can combine to 
reveal the secret.  Each share is maximally entropic, 
revealing no information about the secret, even with 
infinite computation.  
As proved in [20], it is information-theoretically secure, 
not relying on computational problems such as prime 
factorisation, so various uses have been proposed and 
developed, such as secure multi-party computation (MPC).  
However, each encoding produces a set of new shares to be 
distributed to participants via potentially non-secure 
channels, and it is possible for a hacker to intercept 
sufficient shares.  This makes SSS in its original form 
impractical for use, by itself, in messaging systems.  Such 
systems include email, SMS or any textual messaging 
service.  Indeed, emails often lack security [16], 
necessitating extra encryption (commonly RSA [19]), and 
with the introduction of quantum computation such as the 
D-Wave 2 [7], stronger security is desired.  
This paper proposes SSS to secure messages between a 
limited set of trusted users.  The need to distribute all 
shares for every message is eliminated with a collection of 
fixed master shares held by all users.  These are distributed 
only once, after they have been generated (here analogous 
to key generation).  Each transmission creates a temporary 
"transient" share, sent over the network and combined with 
the recipient's master share to reveal the message.  As 
such, although only (2, 2)-SSS (i.e. where a threshold of 
two shares are required out of a total of two shares) is used 
in this paper, the advantage of SSS is its ability to form 
access structures, potentially involving multiple users in a 
secure transmission.  The contributions of this paper are as 
follows:  
 
● Equations are derived from the standard SSS 
model for the generation of transient share 
elements using master share elements and 
message characters.  
● Algorithms are proposed for the creation of 
master and transient shares that correctly combine 
to reveal any required confidential message, as 
well as to decode it on receipt.  
● Multi-use master shares are made possible, with 
statistical linguistic analysis prevented with 
message and share obfuscation.  
● Preliminary revocation and addition methods are 
suggested.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:  
Section 2 reviews prior secret sharing literature.  Section 3 
details Shamir's secret sharing.  Section 4 proposes secure 
messaging, including key generation in 4.1, encoding in 
4.2 and decoding in 4.3.  Section 5 demonstrates secure 
transmission of messages using these algorithms and 
discusses various attacks.  Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
study and suggests further research directions. 
 
2 Related Work  
 
In 1979, two methods for the secure secret sharing of 
cryptographic keys were devised independently in [20] and 
[5].  In both, the secret can be in character string format, 
which is converted to numeric format using ASCII values.  
In Blakley’s method, each share is an ( 1)n -hyperplane 
with the secret encoded into the unique coordinate in n-
dimensional space at which planes intersect.  
Shamir’s SS reduces space complexity versus Blakley’s 
method (since each share in the latter must be at least k 
times larger than the secret) by encoding the secret into the 
constant terms of k randomly selected coordinates of an 
( 1)n -degree polynomial.  A line, for example, encodes a 
(2, 2)-SS scheme, since two points are required to 
reconstruct it and derive its constant term.  It therefore 
benefits from perfect information-theoretic security, as 
fewer than k points on a ( 1)k  -degree curve can be 
coordinates on any of an infinitude of ( 1)k  -degree 
polynomials (assuming real-valued coefficients).  
Prior practical application of SSS has been in the 
concealment of graphical information, whether it is 
personal bitmap images while in transit via a network, or 
highly confidential imagery, such as medical images and 
biometric data.  In [21], SSS is used to bring about 
threshold access structures for sharing graphical medical 
data, such that shares are held by a large number of 
professionals.  Ref. [1] similarly proposes a method for the 
concealment of biometrics.  
SSS is not the only form of secret sharing applicable to 
image data.  The most well-known method is visual 
cryptography, developed by Naor and Shamir [18] to build 
shares that can be printed onto transparent sheets and 
physically stacked to visually reveal the secret.  Although 
less computationally costly than SSS, which does not 
permit visual decoding, reconstruction is extremely lossy.  
Similarly, the random grids method of [11], improved in 
[22], results in the same kind of shares but benefits from 
smaller shares and lack of complicated rulebooks.  
Circles, as opposed to polynomials, are used in [10] to 
bring about (3, n)-SS, but only allow threshold access 
structures, i.e. those representable by fully connected 
(hyper)graphs, are allowed (as in Figure 1a).  The Chinese 
Remainder Theorem (CRT) can be used to bring about 
general access, and was first proposed in [3], whose work 
has since become known as the Asmuth-Bloom method.  
Interestingly, this was used in [12] as an alternative to SSS 
for threshold access, as they proved it more efficient.  
The present proposal is comparable to the one-time-pad 
used in the 1960s Cold War era to transmit messages with 
(at least in principle) information-theoretic security, using 
random numbers known only to the sender and receiver.  
That technique does not however allow for expansion into 
more complex access structures, unlike secret sharing.  
Effectively, as shown below, such structures allow the 
secret to be revealed to specified user subsets, whereas 
other subsets gain no information about the secret message.  
 
 (a)  (b)  
Figure 1.  Secret sharing access structures shown as 
graphs.  (a) (3, 3)-SS.  (b) Five-share general graph access 
structure.  
 
Revocation and addition of keys is here analogous to 
deletion and creation of shares in such a way that security 
and integrity are maintained.  In conventional SSS, new 
shares are created by simply selecting unused points on the 
curve and dealing them, but deleting a participant involves 
removing his/her knowledge of the scheme, hence 
changing the polynomial.  This was solved in [9] by using 
SSS along with CRT, Vandermonde matrices and "virtual 
automaton" to enable entering and leaving schemes at will 
and changing the secret on the fly.  
Security in SS has been the subject of much study.  
Despite being information-theoretically secure, if k is less 
than n, an adversary having fewer than k shares can indeed 
narrow the list of potential secrets from the infinite to the 
finite.  In the author's prior work [6], additional 
alphanumeric keys were suggested to vary the polynomial 
term used to encode a respective character, and in [8], 
different entropic metrics are compared with Kolmogorov 
complexity [14] in the context of SS to show equivalence 
between these security metrics and they prove that all 
entropy metrics are maximal if shares are uniformly 
randomly generated.  
As pointed out in [16], email is inherently non-secure, 
with the vast majority of email servers leaving messages 
open to interception and reading of plaintext.  Although 
public-key cryptography is sometimes used, they 
developed a more efficient protocol, SMEMail.  Similarly, 
an SS solution to messaging security based on 
computationally secure SS was given in [13], which 
addresses the problem of creating smaller share sizes with 
efficient MPC.  However, their proposal relies on 
computationally secure symmetric ciphers.  Secret sharing 
is indeed integral in maintaining perfect security in MPC.  
In this, the idea is to compute 
1 2( , ,...)y f x x , making the 
result public but concealing the function arguments, shares 
of which are then distributed.  
Shamir's SS has similarly found use in secure multi-
cloud, distributing data across servers as random shares.  In 
most cases, such data is first encrypted, then the crypto-
keys are shared, but recent work such as [17] has suggested 
sharing both data and keys.  If the data is too large, it is 
seen as more efficient to merely share keys to the data, but 
[2] developed a system called CloudStash to share all data, 
using low-cost cloud storage and multi-threading to 
improve fault-tolerance.  They show that sharing small 
files is more efficient than sharing keys, and even large 
files do not incur significant cost.  
 
3 Background to Secret Sharing  
 
Guide to Notation  
, 1,..., ,ip i    P  is the collection of participants. 
, 1,..., ,is i    S  is the collection of characters 
comprising the message. 
M
H  is the collection of master shares. 
M M
i HH  is the master share held by ip . 
TH  is the transient share conveying a respective message 
between two participants. 
Share elements are denoted using square brackets.  For 
example, [ ]
T iH  is the value of the ith element in the 
transient share, or [ , ]
T j iH  is the value of the red channel 
bitmap pixel in the ith column of the jth row. 
, (    or ),   are resp. lower and upper bounds 
of TH  elements. 
( )random X  returns a random member of set X, but if it 
has a trailing superscript, a random matrix of given 
dimensions is returned. 
  is a constant known to all pP , such that 
, 1,...,ix i i n    
 
For simplicity in this section, we consider splitting a 
secret number s into shares , 1,...,i i nH , where n is the 
number of shares.  Any k of these must be combined to 
reveal the secret.  This is a threshold (k, n)-SSS scheme, 
the simplest of which is a (2, 2)-SSS.  This sharing 
requires polynomial,  
1
1
1
, ({ ,..., })
k
k i
i i
i
y r x s r random  

 

 
   
 
  (1) 
where each 
ir   lies within arbitrarily chosen 
coefficient bounds ,  .  
The dealer randomly selects distinct points 
( , ), 1,...,i ix y i n  on y and hands one to each participant.  
Combining k of these reveals the coefficients, notably s.  
Shares of s are thus defined as,  
( , ), 1,...,i i ix y i n H     (2) 
Letting 
ix i  eliminates x-coordinates, decreasing 
network overhead.  In the results presented in this paper, 
1  .  
The secret can be decoded using Lagrangian 
interpolation.  Coordinates in (2) are used to calculate,  
,ij qual
j X i X j i
x x
y y X
x x   
 
  
  
    (3) 
where qual  is a qualified subset of share indices.  The 
result of (3) is expanded to a polynomial of degree 1k  .  
The coefficients of the terms in 1 2, ,...,k kx x x   are ignored 
(as they are random), but the constant is decoded as the 
secret.  
If the secret is a message, each character is converted 
into its ASCII numeric code, which is encoded separately 
into its own shares.  In this case, the ith share of the jth 
character is denoted ( , )
j
i ix y .  If ix i , it can simply be 
denoted ( )
j
iy .  That is, 
1( ) ,..., ( )i i iy y
H . 
 
4 Proposed Method  
 
In this section, the method for multi-use master share 
textual secret sharing is proposed.  Section 4.1 discusses 
initialisation, i.e. creation and dealing of master shares, and 
Section 4.2 discusses the encoding of messages, whereby a 
transient share is created and transmitted following two 
obfuscation operations.  Finally, Section 4.4 briefly 
discusses revocation.  
 
4.1 Key Generation  
 
In the present proposal, the keys are analogous to the 
master shares.  The dealer DP  designates   as the 
currently known number of trusted participants and 
generates a master share for each one.  Algorithm 1 
summarises key generation.  
 Algorithm 1: Key Generation through the Creation of 
Master Shares  
Inputs:     
Outputs:  
M
H   
Procedure: 
Set  as the maximum message length   
 0, 255     
 w   
 
  
For 1,...,i  , Do   
   3( ,..., )M w wi random  
  H   
Store 
M
iH as an RGB bitmap image   
End For   
 1( ,..., )
M M M
H H H   
  
In the present proposal, shares are stored in raw bitmap 
files, wherein the value of each pixel in the red channel is 
the respective share element, as in Figure 2.  (Note that 
lthough this share format is comparable to visual 
cryptography, bitmaps are used here for the convenience of 
having different channels for encoding and seeding.)  
The green and blue channels are also randomised but it 
is beneficial to leave these for seeding, which prevents 
known-plaintext attacks.  Furthermore, to prevent related-
key attacks, all members of 
M
H  must be unique and 
randomly different from all other members.  Furthermore, 
to maintain immunity from interception, 
M
H  can never be 
transmitted via the network, but handed over in person.  
 
 
Figure 2.  The use of pixel-randomised icons to store 
and transmit shares as images.  
4.2 Message Encoding  
 
4.2.1 Obfuscation Functions  
 
Encoding uses an obfuscated copy of a respective user's 
master share, allowing it to be securely used multiple times 
without the possibility of interceptors analysing the 
repeated use of the same or similar numbers to apply 
linguistic analysis to them.  Algorithm 2 carries out this 
operation before transmitting a message to the ith 
participant.  It uses any cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generator (CSPRNG) initially seeded by 
the current Unix Timestamp (UT).  (UT is only input, as 
opposed to sampled anew, when called later by Algorithm 
4 to decode the message.)  Shares are contained in the red 
channel of bitmaps, a row and column index to locate an 
element.  
 
Algorithm 2: Master Share Obfuscation  
Inputs:  ,
M
i H , optionally UT  
Outputs:   Mi H   
Procedure: 
Sample UT if not provided as input.  
1seed UT   
2 0seed    
w   width of bitmap holding MiH   
Set numPixels //5 IS A GOOD VALUE  
Seed PRNG with 
1seed .  
Record the date and time components of the UT.  
     
For 1,...,j numPixels , do,  
   (mod )nextj PRNG w   
   (mod )nexti PRNG w   
   
2 2seed seed   24-bit colour value at [ , ]
M
i x yH   
End For  
Seed PRNG with 
2seed .  
     
For 1,...,j w , do,  
   For 1,...,k w , do,  
        [ , ] [ , ] 256.M Mi i nextj k j k PRNG  H H   
         [ , ] [ , ]( mod 1)M Mi ij k j k    H H   
   End For  
End For  
 
There are two stages of pseudo-random number 
generation.  The first relies on UT, which is known to an 
interceptor, who can calculate the pixel positions.  
However, their values have never been transmitted, hence 
cannot be known by that individual, and cannot be 
guessed, as argued in Section 5.2.  Furthermore, using a 
bitmap's red channel leaves other channels never used 
directly in any prior encoding, so their additional 16 
collective bits can be added to the existing 8 bits of the red 
channel to form a 24-bit number.  An arbitrary number of 
pixel values are collected in this way and summed to 
produce a secondary seed.  The temporarily altered master 
share  Mi H  is generated by a modular sum of random 
numbers based on this seed.  
Given in Section 4.2.2 is the equation for deriving a 
transient share element from a master share element based 
on SSS.  Repeated use of this equation results in 
approximately 20% negative correlation between message 
character ASCII code and transient share element, as well 
as a mean P-value too small to have confidence in the null 
hypothesis.  This correlation is eliminated by obfuscation 
of character values and their order, as in Algorithm 3.  
 
Algorithm 3: Message Obfuscation  
Inputs:  ,
M
iS H , UT used in Algorithm 2  
Outputs:  S  (obfuscated message)  
Procedure: 
secondsUT   seconds value from UT  
seed   24-bit colour value at [1,1] 100.Mi secondsUTH   
Seed PRNG with the calculated value above  
Permutate the order of elements in  1 ,..., Ss s   //BASED 
ON SEEDED PRNG  
Reseed PRNG with the calculated value above  
     
For 1,...,j S , do,  
   js   numeric ASCII code of jth character in S  
   If 94js  , then 255j js s   , End If  
   
1 ([0,...,10])r random  // SEEDED PRNG  
   
2 ([ 7,..., 7])r random    / SEEDED PRNG  
   1j js s r     
   Rotate bits of js   by 2r  positions  
End For      
1 ,..., Ss s   S   
 
As with share obfuscation, the present operation uses 
information unknown to an interceptor.  Note that the seed 
is taken from the top-left master share pixel, but the system 
can use any pixel (preferably one never used for encoding), 
as long as the position is consistent and known to all 
participants.  The value 94 is selected based on the authors' 
experimental observation that this is approximately the 
mean ASCII value of characters comprising passages of 
text (seemingly varying little in different Roman alphabet 
languages).  
4.2.2 Creation of Transient Shares  
 
Conventional SSS creates the entire share set anew each 
time a secret is encoded, but in this paper, each user retains 
a permanent master share, , {1,..., }
M
i i H , of which the 
sender creates an obfuscated version  Mi H  before 
transmission.  
If 
ix i , each master share element 
  [ ], 1,...,Mi j j  H  is the coordinate  1, ( ) jy  on a 
Cartesian plane.  Coordinate [ ]
T jH  must be calculated 
such that an adjoining line crosses the vertical axis at 
jy s .  Any number of lines can pass through [ ]
M
i jH  to 
cross any required point on the y-axis, hence allowing 
reuse of master shares.  Figure 3 demonstrates the concept.  
Here, the intersection point of the two lines is an element a 
user's master share, and the other two points can be 
considered elements of transient shares for two different 
messages.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Intersecting lines encoding different ASCII 
codes simultaneously in two shares.  
The gradient of Line 2 for 
1 2x x x   is 
2
2 1
2
2 1
y y
x x


.   
Since the vertical axis intersect is the constant, the gradient 
of Line 2 for 
10 x x   is 
1
1
iy s
x

.  Since these gradients 
are of the same line, they are equal.  Furthermore,  1 1,x y  
and 
is  are known, and selecting a value for 
2
2x , the value 
of 
2
2y  becomes,  
2 2
2 2 1 1 2
2
1
( )
, 1,...,i
x y s x x
y i
x

 
   (4) 
If ( )
j
ix i   (in Figure 3, 4  ), 
2 1( ) 2( )i ix x , this 
further reduces (4) to,  
2
2 1 2 12 2 , 1,...,
j
ix x y y s i       (5) 
Using either of these equations produces an TH  that is 
maximally entropic.  Note in (5) that the ASCII value, 
effectively a constant, is subtracted from twice 
1y , a 
random number, so 
2
2y  must also be random.  However, it 
is clear that larger values of 
is  will tend to produce 
smaller values of 
2y , requiring the use of  
M
i H  and S  
respectively output by Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3.  
Figure 4 summarises encoding and transmission, 
wherein 
Ap  sends a confidential message to Bp .  Note that 
the message date and time of creation is also transmitted, 
along with  .  The latter is necessary for the recipient to 
determine how many bitmap pixels to decode as ASCII 
values.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Summary of encoding and transmission  
 
4.3 Message Decoding  
 
Decoding reverses encoding, but alters the recipient 
master share in the same way as during encoding, hence 
Algorithm 2 is called.  The method is described in 
Algorithm 4.  
Algorithm 4: Message Decoding  
Inputs:  TH , received UT,    
Outputs:  S   
Procedure: 
Derive  Mi H  from MiH  using Alg. 2 with UT as input  
S    
secondsUT   seconds value from received UT  
seed   24-bit value at [1,1] 100.
M
i secondsUTH   
Seed PRNG with the calculated value above  
     
For 1,...,j  , do,  
   
1 2, 2x x   , where 1 2,x x    
      1 2[ ], [ ]M Tiy j y j   H H , where 1 2,y x    
   2 1
2 1
y y
m
x x



  
   
1 1c y mx    
   
1 ([0,...,10])r random  // SEEDED PRNG  
   
2 ([ 7,..., 7])r random    // SEEDED PRNG  
   Rotate bits of c  
2r  positions  
   
1c c r    
   If 94c  , then 255c c  , End If  
   Convert c to ASCII character and append to S  
End For  
Reseed PRNG with the calculated value above  
1,...,   randomly permutated // SEEDED PRNG  
,temp S  concatenated as two columns  
Sort temp in ascending order by first column  
S  transpose of second column of temp  
Convert ASCII values of S  to characters and display the 
decoded message  
 
Algorithm 3 cannot be executed during decoding, as its 
operations must happen in reverse.  Furthermore, to 
reverse the permutation, the recipient must use the same 
seed to permutate 1,...,  and equate S  element indices to 
those values, reordering the characters to recreate the 
message sent by 
Ap .  
1.1 Remarks on Revocation  
A new trusted recipient requires a master share that is 
either new or currently not in use.  The latter simply 
requires the dealer to create more shares than participants 
during initialisation.  In this case, all current participants 
must be made aware of the value of i for 
M M
i HH  
corresponding to the newcomer.  This can happen in a pre-
agreed manner of blanket emailing (using master shares) 
the requisite details to current participants.  
This proposal is intended for a limited number of trusted 
users (given that 
M
H  is provided to all users in its 
entirety).  It is possible to generate 
M
iH  from 1
M
iH  in a 
similar way that transient shares are created, by using pixel 
data in 
M
iH  to seed PRNGs for the creation of 1
M
iH .  As 
this data has never been transmitted and assumed unknown 
to an interceptor, 1
M
iH  is by extension unknown.  This 
therefore provides a mechanism for the creation of master 
shares for newcomers, but still requires a blanket email to 
inform all current users of the addition.  
Removal of a user must be orchestrated by D and 
involve the cooperation of all remaining users.  It is not 
enough to remove the leaving user's details from the 
scheme, as that person must still be assumed to have access 
to 
M
H  and be able to use it to send messages.  It is 
therefore necessary to permanently alter all shares in 
M
H  
for all participants except the leaver.  D organises this by 
sending seeding data through the system to all remaining 
users, which they can each use in combination with data 
from their current master shares, to pseudo-randomly 
generate and permanently store new shares.  
Although these are randomly different from the old ones 
and an outsider still has no access to any of the  data, the 
process is deterministic.  Hence, all participants calculate 
and store the same share set.  (Indeed, this process can be 
regularly executed to continually alter 
M
H , so that a 
message received, for example, the previous day, cannot be 
decoded the following day using the same master share.) 
 
5 Results and Discussion  
 
5.1 Simulation Results  
 
The parameters used here are 0, 255, 1     , 
with shares stored as 100 100 -pixel bitmaps with a red, 
green and blue channel.  Master shares are randomly 
initialised, and the first 10 elements of the respective 
colour channels of 1
MH  and 2
MH  are as follows:  
1
(161,174,181,20,112,165,250,54,73,0,...) ,
(147,2,29,91,25,116,204,168,9,155,...) ,
(78,74,181,80,78,169,4,133,230,108,...)
red
M green
blue
 
 
  
 
 
H  
2
(89,106,254,22,145,144,185,99,125,246,...) ,
(33,220,116,91,249,218,88,238,204,22,...) ,
(85,222,251,110,104,130,18,229,173,57,...)
red
M green
blue
 
 
  
 
 
H   
These shares and those of any other participants 
comprise set 
M
H , which is physically handed to all 
participants.  At time 10:40:29 on date 14/04/2015, the 
following short message is typed by 
Ap  to be transmitted 
to 
Bp .  Given also is the resulting ASCII value sequence.  
"Hello, how are you today?" 
 {72, 101, 108, 108, 111, 44, 32, 104, 111, 119, 32, 97, 
114, 101, 32, 121, 111, 117, 32, 116, 111, 100, 97, 121, 
63}  
Therefore, 25  .  
Ap  knows that,  
2 [1,..., ]
M  H {89, 106, 254, 22, 145, 144, 185, 99, 125, 
246, 209, 205, 124, 154, 94, 247, 216, 63, 119, 217, 31, 
214, 226, 3, 55} 
red
.  
Ap  sets the pseudo-random seed to the current date-
time (UT), randomly selects five pixels from 2
MH  and 
sums their 24-bit values to produce seed 19558611.  He 
then uses Algorithm 2 to produce altered recipient master 
share red channel:  
 2M  H {93,197,214,186,168,71,85,30,135,209,...} red   
He seeds PRNG in Algorithm 3 based on 
secondsUT  and 
the 24-bit pixel value at 2 [1,1]
MH  and runs the algorithm to 
create obfuscated message  S {100, 62, 13, 122, 10, 248, 
73, 168, 204, 232,...}.  
As   , x-coordinates are fixed, so (5) is used to 
produce transient share T H  {86, 332, 415, 250, 326, -
106, 97, -108, 66, 186}.  These values are normalised to lie 
within {0,...,255} and remaining pixel values are padded 
with random numbers.  
This share is transmitted to 
Bp  via email or other 
messaging system, along with UT and  .  It is crucial to 
note the recipient has access to the same 2
MH  and UT as 
the sender, therefore seeds Algorithm 3 with the same 
value to produce  2M H .  She then interpolates respective 
coordinates in her master share and the received transient 
share, as follows:  
 
Table 1.  Calculation of line equations from master and 
transient shares  
Master 
Share 
Values 
Transient 
Share 
Values 
Line Equations 
89 86 y=-3m+92 
106 332 y=226m-120 
254 415 y=161m+93 
22 250 y=228m-206 
145 326 y=181m-36 
144 -106 y=-250m+394 
185 97 y=-88m+273 
99 -108 y=-207m+306 
125 66 y=-59m+184 
246 186 y=-60m+306 
 
PRNG is re-seeded with the aforementioned value, and 
the constants of the line equations in Table 1 are randomly 
altered as in Algorithm 4 to produce the message "H 
e?lytur wl  oaohaode,yo".  This was originally permutated 
based on seed 
24
2, [1,1]
M bits
secondsUT
H , so she randomly 
permutates sequence 1,...,  based on this to produce  
(1, 2, 17, 15, 24, 4, 21, 13, 6, 9, 14, 23, 11, 3, 8, 12, 22, 18, 
25, 5, 20, 7, 19, 16, 10).  This and the ASCII values of S  
are transposed, column-wise concatenated, and the 
resulting 25 2  matrix sorted by   in ascending order.  
She extracts the S  column, transposes it and converts its 
values to their character equivalents to produce the original 
confidential message, S  that was sent by 
Ap .  
 
5.2 Security Analysis  
 
This analysis will begin with definitions of specific 
attack types, then argue security against those attacks and 
general attacks, such as cipher-text-only.  
 
5.2.1 Specific Attack Definitions  
 
Definition 1:  Exploitation of Common Elements in 
Transient Shares  
Without Algorithm 2 to map ( )
M M
i i H H  when 
sending a message to the ith participant, two messages, 
1
is  
and 
2
is , sent at different times, produce identical versions 
of TH .  Moreover, different messages containing common 
characters at the same position indices produce identical 
TH  elements at those positions.  Taking account of (5) and 
Figure 3, this attack is defined by the following procedure:  
   1)  
1
2 12 iy y s   and 
2
2 12 iy y s   .  
   2)  
1
2
1
2
iy sy

   and 
2
2
1
2
iy sy
 
 .  
   3)  
1 2
2 2i iy s y s    .  
   4)  He rearranges this to derive:  
2 1
2 2i is y y s   .  
   5)  He assumes that 
2
is  contains a string of the one 
character most likely to be found in the message, for 
example the letter "e".  
   6)  He calculates the resulting 
2
is  based on the equation 
in step 4.  
   7)  He eliminates his assumptions about 
1
is  at all 
position indices where an "unlikely" message character 
has been derived in 
2
is  (as explained below).  
   8)  He repeats steps 5, 6 and 7 for the second most likely 
character.  He can either leave the already assumed 
characters as they are, or create new assumptions, some 
of which might overwrite the previous ones.  
   9)  He continues with assumed characters of descending 
likelihood, until enough information about the messages 
is gained to make intelligent guesses as to their contents.  
 
Definition 2:  Exploitation of the Correlation Between 
Share and Message  
Conventionally, when two shares are generated, they are 
individually statistically equivalent to randomly generated 
sequences, but if one share is generated using (4) or (5) 
without obfuscation, a significant negative correlation 
(approximately 20%) results between TH  and S.  
An interceptor of TH , knowing this correlation exists, 
correctly assumes that smaller transient share elements are 
more likely to encode larger ASCII values and vice versa.  
He determines the range of values in TH  and decides 
which values to categorise as small and large.  (For 
instance, small values could be those below half the mean.)  
According to [15], "r", "s" and "t" occur with a 
frequency of 21% in the English language and "e", "a" and 
"d" occur with a frequency of 25.1%, so he assumes small 
share values to encode one of the former and large values 
to encode one of the latter.  He might add the space 
character (ASCII value 32) to the latter, as it occurs with a 
frequency of 19.2% in English.  Although most of these 
assumptions would be incorrect, he now has a "hook" into 
the ciphertext that can allow him to carry out further 
statistical linguistic analysis.  
 
5.2.2 Generic Attacks  
 
Ciphertext Attacks  
This attack succeeds if the interceptor accesses 
sufficient transient shares to decipher the plaintext or 
derive the correct master share to combine with the present 
(or future) transient shares to reveal the plaintext.  Without 
obfuscation, [ ], 1,...,
T j j H  with the jth character 
identical across the respective messages, are coordinates 
on a line that pass through the coordinate given in 
M
iH  for 
the ith recipient.  Those transient share elements therefore 
lie on the same line, which can easily be interpolated to 
retrieve js .  
Only two intercepted ciphertexts are required, as 
respective transient share elements 
2y  and 2y   are equal, 
allowing step 3 of Definition 1 to execute.  However, 
Algorithm 2 randomly alters both these values using seeds 
calculated from UT and 
M
iH .  The latter has never been 
seen by the interceptor, so he cannot directly calculate the 
seed.  
Even if the interceptor can predict the correct seed, he 
cannot execute the second loop in Algorithm 2, as he has 
no knowledge of 
M
iH .  He can attempt a brute-force guess 
at its structure, but because share elements are nothing but 
polynomial coordinates, 
2
2y  can be swapped with 1y  in (5) 
to produce a version of 
M
iH  to encode any message up to 
  characters.  Therefore, any brute-force (or otherwise) 
guess at 
M
iH  is as good as any other guess.  
Since the interceptor has no access to 
M
iH , and both 
shares are needed, by definition, to decode the message, 
the method is secure against ciphertext attacks.  
 
Known-plaintext Attacks  
This attack succeeds if the interceptor obtains a 
sufficient number of pairs of transient shares and 
corresponding plaintexts to gain information about future 
messages by indirect calculation or by constructing 
knowledge of the ith recipient's master share to directly 
decode those messages.  The method presented in this 
study assumes trusted users who divulge no information 
about shares or messages to outsiders, but if the interceptor 
illegally gains access to the requisite messages, he can 
attempt the attack.  
He swaps the vertical coordinates in (5) to calculate 
[ ] 2 [ ] , 1,...,M Ti jj j s j   H H .  Without Algorithm 2, 
this allows him to decode all future messages up to   
characters, but each future message is encoded using 
 Mi H , mapped using 2seed .  However, with the use of 
the red channel of bitmaps to carry shares and the 24-bit 
RGB values for seeding, he only has knowledge of a 
randomly obfuscated version of part of the red channel.  
He has however no knowledge of the information used to 
calculate 
2seed  nor of the original master share on which 
it is applied.  
As discussed in the context of ciphertext attacks, any 
guess he makes as to the structure of the master share is no 
better than any other guess.  Furthermore, all successive 
interceptions of shares and their plaintexts likewise only 
reveal obfuscated data about the red channel with no 
information about the other channels.  Neither the original 
master share nor future messages can thus be obtained, 
preventing the attack.  
 
Chosen-plaintext Attacks  
The chosen-plaintext attack succeeds if the hacker is 
able to successfully encode a message of his choosing into 
a transient share, so that he can gain information about the 
key.  However, the cryptographic key is analogous to 
M
iH , 
to which the outsider does not have access, by the 
definition of the method.  Therefore, he cannot attempt this 
attack.  
Similarly, the chosen ciphertext attack succeeds if the 
hacker successfully decodes a message from a chosen 
master share.  This is again not possible, by the definition 
of the method.  He can of course derive the correct shares 
for a plaintext of his choosing, or the correct 
complementary share and message, given one share, but 
this is simply the creation of a new SS scheme, bearing no 
information about the actual master share.  
 
Adaptive Chosen-plaintext and -ciphertext Attacks  
For either of these attacks to succeed, the hacker must 
first carry out a chosen-plaintext (or chosen-ciphertext) 
attack and adapt future attempts based on the results of 
previous attempts.  However, as already discussed, neither 
of these attacks is possible, so no adaptation can occur.  
 
Related-key Attacks  
The interceptor attempts this attack by obtaining 
transient shares encoded using 
1 2
, ,...M Mi iH H  encoding the 
same message and exploiting similarities between the 
master shares to derive those shares and combine them 
with intercepted transient shares to decode messages.  As 
discussed in Section 4.1, all members of 
M
H  must be 
unique and randomly different from each other, avoiding 
similarities and rendering the attack moot.  
The security against this attack furthermore follows 
from that of ciphertext attacks, which is equivalent in the 
present method to attempting to exploit similarities 
between different obfuscated versions of the same master 
share.  
 
Frequency Analysis Attacks  
This attack succeeds if the interceptor exploits varying 
frequencies of TH  elements to derive the plaintext based 
on known linguistic character frequencies.  As   [ ]Mi jH  
is a random number, the resulting [ ]
T jH  given by (5) is 
also random, so different instances of the same character 
are differently encoded with a random relationship 
between the encodings, so trivial forms of this type of 
analysis are not possible.  
However, the specific attack given in Definition 2 can 
be attempted by exploiting the correlation between S  and 
TH  with knowledge of linguistic structure.  However, 
Algorithm 3 not only pseudo-randomly alters the ASCII 
values of all characters, but shuffles them, destroying any 
resemblance to a language.  
Furthermore, as in Algorithm 2, the PRNG is seeded 
from UT and 
M
iH .  As discussed previously, the 
interceptor can attempt to guess the structure of this share 
by brute-force or otherwise, but any message up to length 
  can be encoded using a respective master share, so all 
possible guesses have equal value.  
1.2 Comparative Analysis  
1.2.1 Comparisons with Other SS Work  
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first 
study proposing textual secret sharing using SSS as an 
independent method for confidential messaging, so the 
following analysis compares this study to other secret 
sharing research.  The most important criterion is master 
share capability, but also highlighted are access structures, 
rulebooks (for example basis matrices of visual 
cryptography), whether a transmitted signal contains an 
encrypted version of the message (as opposed to a 
maximally entropic share of it), and the ability to add 
and/or delete users.  
 
 
Table 2.  Comparative analysis between this study and prior secret sharing work  
Study Master 
Shares 
Possible 
Threshold 
Access 
General 
Access 
Rulebooks 
Required 
Trans. 
Contains 
Encrypted 
Message 
Addition/ 
Deletion 
[20] No Yes No No No* Yes/No 
[5] No No No No No* Yes/No 
[21] No Yes No No No* Yes/No 
[1] No Yes No No No* Yes/No 
[18] No Yes No Yes No* No 
[11] Yes No No No No No 
[22] Yes Yes No No No No 
[10] No Yes No No No* Yes/No 
[3] No Yes Yes No No* Yes/No 
[9] Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
[16] n/a n/a n/a No Yes Yes 
[2] No Yes No Yes No* Yes 
[6] No Yes No Yes Yes No 
[17] No Yes No No No* Yes 
present 
proposal 
Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
*Note that although the secret sharing methods in Table 
2 necessarily produce maximally entropic shares 
impossible to individually decipher, those that lack master 
share capability necessitate the transmission of all shares, 
likely at different times to the respective users.  In this 
case, enough intercepted shares of the same secret leak that 
secret.  Equivalently, the Cloud applications in [2] and [17] 
are vulnerable if the various Cloud servers are 
simultaneously infiltrated. 
The proposed method does not currently support access 
structure.  Although they not need for a straight-forward 
communication between two individuals, they would be 
useful for more complex communications, for example if 
the recipient requires both her own and her manager's 
master share to decode the message.  
 
 
 
6 Conclusion and Further Work  
 
This paper has proposed Shamir's Secret Sharing, an 
information-theoretically secure cipher, as an independent 
method to secure textual messages such that the 
transmitted signal only contains a random share of the 
message.  Each participant is handed a copy (itself 
optionally encrypted) of the master share set.  The sender 
uses the data in the recipient's master share and message 
data to generate a transient share for transmission.  The 
recipient combines this with her master share to reveal the 
message.  Master shares are fully reusable, because each 
transient share results from two levels of random 
obfuscation, with the PRNG seeded from data in the 
recipient's master share.  By definition, an outsider has not 
seen this, but might attempt to guess it by brute force or 
otherwise.  However, he can derive a share that correctly 
decodes any sequence of characters from the intercepted 
transient share, so all guesses have equal value.  
An advantage of secret sharing is access structures, as 
shown in [3] for sharing data and [4] for sharing images.  
This study is limited to (2, 2) schemes, but ongoing work 
focuses master and transient shares for access structures, 
such that third parties can be involved in decoding.  
Further work will also address trust among users.  This 
will use both conventional ciphers to encrypt 
M
H , as well 
as use SS to share 
M
H  data between participants, such that 
the system combines shares of shares across the network 
before those shares, in turn, combine with the transient 
share to decode the message. 
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